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I. Introduction
Federal habeas corpus review has been called everything from
"another Magna Carta"1 to the "end of the beginning" of a criminal
prosecution.2 The conflict between judicial preservation of expansive
federal habeas review and legislative attempts to limit it is tied to the
Court's view of its role and the elevation of federal courts over state
courts as policymakers. The current approach permits lower federal
courts to be the ultimate arbiters of federal constitutional issues
although the legitimacy of this scheme is flawed. The values implicit
in broad federal habeas review conflict with competing concerns
about finality and efficiency.
I will examine how de novo review of mixed questions of law and
fact (here, in the Miranda context) wastes judicial resources and di-
verts federal courts from claims with more precedential value. Mixed
questions of law and fact should be treated as divisible from the ulti-
mate constitutional question at issue, with a deferential standard of
review applied to the factual component and to the state courts' appli-
cation of the facts under the totality of the circumstances. This ap-
proach is more consistent with the reforms contained in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("the 1996
Act"), 3 which clarified the de novo standard of review as it applies in
federal habeas proceedings.4 Federal courts now cannot ignore state
court judgments, but rather must "focus explicitly on a previous adju-
dication on the merits in state court and . . . decide forthrightly
whether the state court reached the correct outcome."
5
As we seek to balance the costs and benefits of federal habeas
review, the question becomes not how much justice do we want, but
how much can we afford? Reform proposals have contemplated re-
ducing the number of habeas petitions filed, improving the quality of
the petitions, or, in the absence of imposing limits on the scope of
federal habeas review, creating additional courts to handle the peti-
1. 3 WILLAM BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARMS ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 136 (1770),
quoted in WILIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAs CORPUs 7
(Greenwood Press ed. 1980).
2. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?: Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
3. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266 (Supp. 1997)) [hereinafter 1996
Act].
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966), amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (Supp. 1997) [hereinafter as amended].
5. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BuFm. L. REv.
381, 449 (1996).
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tions. I will examine the tensions inherent in the current system and
the relative benefits of decreasing the quantity of petitions, improving
their quality, or increasing the capacity of the reviewing courts. In
addition, I will briefly discuss implementation of some of these ap-
proaches in the 1996 Act.
Federal courts' review of state prisoners' habeas petitions creates
a conflict between at least two fundamental and competing values: in-
dividual constitutional rights on the one hand, and society's desire to
see punishment carried out on the other.6 Most state prisoners who
avail themselves of federal habeas review have been convicted of seri-
ous crimes and received lengthy sentences after a jury trial.7
Although successful petitions are rare,8 the public perception that
dangerous criminals are being released on "technicalities" increases
the pressure on the Court to limit the scope of federal habeas review.
Many critics also suggest that federal habeas review wastefully dupli-
cates the efforts of the state courts and allocates significant judicial
resources to a small percentage of cases without considering whether
the federal court system can bear the costs of such expansive review.9
In charting the limits of federal habeas review, we must not ig-
nore the frustrating reality that we seek a perfect "truth" via an im-
6. Former Attorney General Edwin Meese I characterized the function of the crim-
inal justice system as the "protect[ion] [of] innocent people from the depredations of
criminals." Edwin Meese III, Preface to OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT No. 7, REPORT TO THE ATroRNEY GENERAL
ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS (1988) [hereinafter REvmw
OF STATE JUDGMENTS].
7. In a recent study, the four most common convictions suffered by habeas petition-
ers were homicide (30%), robbery (18%), burglary (16%), and sexual assault (10%). The
median state court sentences imposed ranged from 24 to 30 years. See STATE JUSTICE
INSTITUTE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FED-
ERAL COURTS 35 (1994) [hereinafter SJI STUDY].
8. In a 1979 study, 3.2% of habeas petitions resulted in some relief, and 1.7% resulted
in the petitioner's release. See Paul Robinson, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS REvmw OF STATE COURT JUDGMENTS (Federal Justice Research Pro-
gram 1979) [hereinafter ROBINSON STUDY], cited in REvinw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra
note 6, at 34. In the SJI study, covering the years 1990 and 1992, petitioners were success-
ful in less than 1% of the cases. See SJI STUDY, supra note 7, at 62.
9. Professor Evan Lee has argued that, in the context of federal appellate review,
appellate courts should apply a deferential standard of review to mixed questions because
de novo review does not yield decisions with meaningful precedential value. Lee suggests
that "principled decision making" which results in useful precedent is one of the primary
functions of appellate review. Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper
Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 235,
236-37 (1991).
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perfect system of review.'0 The process of judicial scrutiny is expected
to distill the truth from the facts: "We burn a hot fire here; it melts
down all concealment." 1' The question is whether the successive dis-
tillation of the facts through federal habeas review ultimately yields a
pure result or rather allows the truth to evaporate. 2
. H. Background
A. Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The traditional common law function of the "Great Writ" of
habeas corpus was to "insure the integrity of the process resulting in
imprisonment."' 3 The writ was a pretrial remedy that protected indi-
viduals from arbitrary executive detention.' 4 In colonial America, the
states were considered the "primary protectors of individual lib-
erty."'15 Therefore, the Framers considered it unnecessary to provide
federal habeas review for state prisoners. Rather, they intended the
habeas clause in the Constitution 6 to prevent Congress from sus-
pending state habeas relief for federal prisoners.1 7 Eventually, the ju-
risdiction of the habeas writ was extended to state prisoners, bringing
them under the policies being articulated by the federal government.'
8
The adoption of the writ in the United States was codified in sec-
tion 14 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1789 ("the 1789 Act"), which
provided that "either of the justices of the [United States] supreme
court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of
10. As one commentator noted, the institutional concept of "'freedom from error'
must eventually include a notion that some complex of institutional processes is empow-
ered definitively to establish whether or not there was error." Paul M. Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 447
(1963).
11. ARTHUR MMLER, Tim CRucmLE 89 (Penguin ed. 1976).
12. As the Department of Justice Office of Legal Policy put it, "[tihere is no reason to
believe that a 'better' result is obtained in any objective sense in the small proportion of
cases in which the federal habeas court does reach a different conclusion from the state
courts." REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at iii-iv. Of course, "results" in this
context may be difficult to measure empirically. The relatively small number of reversals
can be used either to support or criticize expansive federal habeas review.
13. DUKER, supra note 1, at 3.
14. See REvEw OF STATE JUDGMENTs, supra note 6, at ii.
15. DUKER, supra note 1, at 181.
16. The Suspension Clause provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
17. See DUKER, supra note 1, at 181.
18. See id.
commitment."' 9 The passage of the 1789 Act raised federalism con-
cerns. Members of Congress objected on the grounds that:
Each State is competent, it is presumed, to pass laws for the
protection of the rights and liberties of its citizens... and in this
consists the independence of the respective States. The means
of obtaining the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus... consti-
tute an important part of the laws of the several States .... If,
therefore, you pass a law on this subject, it will, if it has any
effect, control the laws of the several States; and, in Proportion
as it has this effect, it weakens the respective State authorities,
and tends to consolidate their powers in the General
Government. 2o
Over the next 200 years, critics of federal habeas review continued to
be troubled by the ability of federal courts to impose their constitu-
tional interpretations on the state courts without regard for federalist
principles.
The next major extension of the scope of federal habeas review
came in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 ("the 1867 Act"). The 1867
Act was created "to provide a federal remedy for former slaves who
were being held in involuntary servitude in violation of the... Thir-
teenth Amendment."' The wording of the 1867 Act, which provided
federal habeas review to anyone being held in "restraint of liberty"'
broadened the scope of federal habeas review to include state prison-
ers.' Even after the 1867 Act, however, federal habeas review was
not available to individuals who were imprisoned by a state court of
"competent jurisdiction. '24 Generally, a court with proper jurisdic-
tion had jurisdiction over both the subject of the trial and the person
being tried?25 This view was "consistent with the nineteenth-century
notion of federalism, which placed primary responsibility for individ-
ual liberty and criminal justice on the state courts.
'26
In 1886 the Court first articulated the doctrine of exhaustion,
which provided that federal habeas review was not available until the
19. Habeas Corpus Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81 (1789), quoted in DKER, supra note 1, at
182.
20. 9 ANNALs OF CONG. 502 (1790), quoted in Dutnn, supra note 1, at 186.
21. REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at 3, 9.
22. Id. at 8.
23. See DUKER, supra note 1, at 187, 193-94.
24. Id. at 229.
25. See iU at 245.
26. IA at 248.
Sw~ing 19971 SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW
808 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:803
petitioner had exhausted all the available state remedies.27 In Royall,
the petitioner was indicted under a state statute and, while awaiting
trial in state court, sought to challenge its constitutionality in federal
district court. The district court denied petitioner's writ of habeas
corpus and the Court affirmed, holding that federal courts had the
discretion not to decide federal constitutional questions until after a
state court had considered the issue before it.28 The policy supporting
this decision, as articulated by the Court, was that "the public good
requires that those relations [between state and federal courts] be not
disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution."'29 Royall and its
progeny did not imply that federal habeas review would not be avail-
able, but only that it should be deferred pending a final state court
judgment.
30
Almost thirty years later, in the landmark case of Frank v. Man-
gum, 31 the Court addressed the problem of inadequate state process.
The Court held that state trial court jurisdiction could be "lost" before
exhaustion of state remedies if the court failed to provide adequate
corrective process on appeal.32 Otherwise, federal habeas relief was
available only where state appellate review was "inadequate or un-
available. '33 In Moore v. Dempsey,34 the Court permitted habeas
corpus review where no other means for review was available, but
noted that "mere mistakes of law.., are not to be corrected.
35
In the sharply divided 1952 decision of Brown v. Allen,36 the War-
ren Court articulated the first major modem expansion of the scope of
27. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). This doctrine was later codified. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e) (Supp. 1997) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1966)); see REvnw oF
STATE JuDGMENTS, supra note 6, at 14.
28. See Royall, 117 U.S. at 253.
29. IL at 251.
30. See Bator, supra note 10, at 478-79. Subsequent cases interpreted Royall to mean
that the discretion not to hear habeas claims before the exhaustion of state remedies im-
plies that there will be federal habeas review of those claims after exhaustion. See Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963). Justice Scalia has criticized this interpretation as a misread-
ing of Royall, which he argues did not guarantee state prisoners the right to a federal forum
for all federal constitutional claims, but merely gave them the same rights to federal habeas
review as federal prisoners had. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 722 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
32. See DuyEn, supra note 1, at 250-53.
33. Id. at 256 (citing Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944)).
34. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
35. Id. at 91.
36. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Three Justices wrote separately, concurring in the result. Jus-
tices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter dissented. See id.
federal habeas review. In Brown, the Court consolidated the cases of
three petitioners incarcerated in North Carolina.37 The petitioners
sought federal habeas review of their constitutional claims that there
was racial discrimination in the selection of their juries and that their
coerced confessions were improperly admitted, in violation of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.38 The convictions of all three petitioners were affirmed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court.39 After reiterating the exhaustion
doctrine, the Court held that all constitutional claims could be reliti-
gated on federal habeas, even where state process was adequate.
4
0
Under the Supremacy Clause,4' federal habeas review was
designed to correct misapplications of constitutional law. As Justice
Frankfurter noted in Brown: "The State court cannot have the last say
when it, though on fair consideration[,] ... may have misconceived a
federal constitutional right."'42 Brown sought to have federal courts
correct state court errors in constitutional interpretation.43 In Justice
Frankfurter's somewhat circular analysis, federal courts were best
suited for the task of reviewing claims of constitutional error because
they had been designated by Congress as "the member in the hierar-
chy of the federal judiciary to express the higher [federal constitu-
tional] law."44 Although Justice Frankfurter admitted that this
hierarchy placed even the lower federal courts in a position where
they could override state supreme courts' adjudications of constitu-
tional claims, he argued it was not "a case of a lower court sitting in
judgment on a higher court... [but] merely one aspect of respecting
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution whereby federal law is
higher than State law."45 Justice Frankfurter drew this conclusion de-
spite the fact that state courts are not otherwise bound by the deci-
sions of lower federal courts on federal constitutional issues.
37. See ad
38. See id. at 465.
39. See id. at 447.
40. See id. at 457-58,487; see also Williams, 507 U.S. at 715-16 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) for a summary of the modem scope of federal habeas review.
41. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
42. Brown, 344 U.S. at 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
43. See DUKER, supra note 1, at 258-59 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 106 (1959)). Together, the trio of Brown, Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), established general federal
habeas review of state court judgments in criminal cases. See REvmw oF STATE JUDG-
Mmrrs, supra note 6, at 18.
44. Brown, 344 U.S. at 510 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
45. Id.
Soriniz 19971 SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW
810 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:803
With the unprecedented expansion of the scope of federal habeas
review by the Warren Court, federal habeas review again became "the
medium for broadcasting federal policy."46 The modem Court viewed
habeas corpus review as a means of articulating constitutional values
and "modem-day substantive due process."'47 This expansion of
habeas review, however, was not without its costs. As I will examine
in the context of the Thompson decision, the values of finality, effi-
ciency, and parity between state and federal courts compete with the
values of fairness and vindication of individual liberties enshrined in
far-reaching federal habeas review.48
Expansive federal review of state court decisions creates tension
between the state and federal systems. Implicit in this structure is a
value judgment about the capability of state courts as guardians of
federal constitutional rights. Some commentators have argued that
this tension has productive and valuable side effects, because it "fos-
ter[s] a dialogue" between the federal and state courts.49 This dia-
logue, however, may be "not a dialogue of equals, but of superior and
inferior" in a system where the federal courts always get the last
word.50 Many proponents of federal habeas review suggest that
"[flederal rights are more forcefully vindicated in federal than in state
courts," 5' an argument suggested by precedent.52 This value judg-
ment, which continues to permeate the Court's decisions despite its
disclaimers to the contrary, has significant and damaging conse-
quences for the effective administration of justice.
B. Modem Parameters of Federal Habeas Review
Modem habeas corpus review is a "purely statutory remedy,"
which creates a "quasi-appellate jurisdiction of lower federal courts in
state criminal cases."'53 The Court has held that the primary purpose
46. DuRER, supra note 1, at 181.
47. Id. at 267-69.
48. These competing values were described by Justice O'Connor as finality, federal-
ism, and fairness in Williams, 507 U.S. at 697 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating that values to be considered include "(i) the most effective utilization
of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the minimi-
zation of friction between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance
of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded").
49. DUKER, supra note 1, at 271.
50. Rnvrnw oF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at 53.
51. DUKER, supra note 1, at 271.
52. See, eg., Brown, 344 U.S. at 508-13 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
53. REvmw oF STATE JUDGMErNTS, supra note 6, at i.
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of prosecuting crime is "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suf-
fer."'54 In modem habeas review, however, the fundamental question
of factual guilt or innocence is often irrelevant, as the courts focus on
resolving only claims of constitutional violations.55
Retreating somewhat from the expansive Warren Court interpre-
tations, the Burger Court restricted habeas review in a series of deci-
sions in the 1970s. These cases narrowed the range of claims that may
be raised in habeas petitions by defendants who pleaded guilty,
56
barred consideration of claims that were not properly raised before
the state court, and barred Fourth Amendment claims already liti-
gated in state courts 57 The Court also applied a deferential standard
to state courts' findings of fact. 8
Reform efforts have focused on four major proposals: abolition
or limitation of federal habeas corpus review as a postconviction rem-
edy for state prisoners,59 conditioning availability of federal habeas
review on the failure of meaningful state process,60 imposing statutory
54. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
55. Conversely, as Justice O'Connor has pointed out, "this Court continuously has
recognized that the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side-a sufficient showing of actual
innocence-is normally sufficient, standing alone, to outweigh other concerns and justify
adjudication of the prisoner's constitutional claim." Williams, 507 U.S. at 700 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970).
57. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (holding that a petitioner's
failure to make timely objections to the admission of inculpatory statements under a state
rule bars federal habeas review of a Miranda claim); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95
(1976) (holding that a state prisoner who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a
Fourth Amendment claim may not obtain habeas review of any allegation that his convic-
tion was based on evidence obtained by an illegal search or seizure).
A recent attempt to apply the Stone analysis to preclude federal habeas review of
Miranda claims, supported by the Attorneys General of 35 states, was rejected by the
Court, with vigorous opposition from Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas. See Williams, 507 U.S. at 702. The Court has also declined to apply
the Stone rationale to claims of insufficient evidence, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
324 (1979), racial discrimination in jury selection, see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,560-61
(1979), and ineffective assistance of counsel, see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,
373-83 (1986).
58. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). See generally Rvinw OF STATE JUDG-
mrENrs, supra note 6, at iv-v.
59. REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at i. This drastic step was proposed
in Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, but was later de-
leted as part of a compromise to ensure the Bill's passage. See id. at 30-31.
60. See id. at vi; see also Williams, 507 U.S. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Scalia
suggests that no federal habeas review should be available where the petitioner has already
had "full and fair opportunity to litigate [the] claim." Id. This approach has been criticized
on the ground that it still requires federal courts to make value judgments about the ade-
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time limits for filing habeas corpus petitions,61 and creating a statutory
standard of greater deference to state court findings, which would em-
ploy a "clearly erroneous" rather than a de novo standard of review.62
One successful legislative effort to limit the scope of federal habeas
review was the 1966 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the statute that
provides federal habeas review for state prisoners.6 3 On April 24,
1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 were again amended by the 1996
Act.64 Some key provisions of the Act incorporate procedural limita-
tions, 65 establish statutes of limitation for filing federal habeas peti-
tions,6 and clarify the responsibilities of reviewing federal courts in
the amended § 2254(d).6
The current system of federal habeas review has been criticized as
both showing an "unjustified preference for aggrandizing the lower
federal courts at the expense of the state judiciaries" 68 and being
tainted by "a one-sided concern with defense interests-and a correla-
tive disregard of competing public interests and constitutional val-
quacy of state courts' evaluation of federal constitutional claims. See REvmw OF STATE
JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at vi.
61. See REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at vi. Unsuccessful legislation
has proposed a one-year statute of limitation for filing habeas petitions. See Criminal Jus-
tice Reform Act, H.R. 3777, 100th Cong. (1988), and S. 1970, 101st Cong. (1990)). Who Is
on Trial?: Conflicts Between the Federal and State Judicial Systems in Criminal Cases, Hear-
ing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th Cong., 7-8, 152 (1988)
[hereinafter Who Is on Trial?] (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice); Jim Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Need for
Reform, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1036, 1042 (1982).
Time limits were finally imposed by the 1996 Act. Under the Act prisoners must file
habeas petitions within one year of the date of the final state court judgment, unless certain
exceptions apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat.
1217 (1996).
62. See REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at vi-vii. This proposal contem-
plates legislative extension of the Stone rationale to bar federal habeas review of Miranda
and Massiah claims. Id.; see also Yackle, supra note 5, at 423-26 for a summary of reform
proposals from the 1940s to 1980s.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended. See REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at
iii for other examples of successful legislative reform.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e) (Supp. 1997).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2253, as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 102, 110 Stat. 1217 (1996)
(limiting circumstances of federal habeas appeal); FED. ApP. P. 22, as amended (amending
subsection (a)(1) requiring transfer of application from circuit to district court, (2) prohib-
iting application with the circuit court after denial from the district court and, (3) providing
for appeal to the appropriate court).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1217
(1996) (providing for a one year statute of limitations on federal habeas claims).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(d)-(i), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 104, 110 Stat.
1218 (1996).
68. REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at v.
ues." 69 Supporters of expansive federal review emphasize the need to
protect individual constitutional rights from abusive governmental
power. Equating public interest with constitutional values, however,
can either support or detract from the importance of federal habeas
review. The Court's decision in Thompson is an example of the
Court's awareness of and attempts to address (or disregard) these
concerns and criticisms.70
C. The Statutory Presumption of Correctness
In 1966, Congress amended § 2254(d) to create a presumption of
correctness for state court findings of fact.7 1 Under the amended stat-
ute, the federal habeas court was not required to conduct a new evi-
dentiary hearing if the state courts' conclusions were made after a
hearing on the merits by a court with competent jurisdiction and were
supported by adequate written findings.72 If a case fell within one of
the eight statutory exceptions, however, the presumption of correct-
ness did not apply.73
In 1996 § 2254(d) was amended, and now provides that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
69. Id,
70. See infra notes 154-181 and accompanying text.
71. Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2(a)-(d), 80 Stat. 1105 (1966).
72. 28 U.S.C § 2254(d), as amended by Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1105 (1966).
73. The eight exceptions were:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing,
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing,
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing,
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the per-
son of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding-,
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding, or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding,
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made.., is produced as provided for...
and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole
concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(8), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (Supp.
1997)).
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merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.74
The former § 2254(d) was redesignated as § 2254(e). 75 Section
2254(e) now governs the effect that federal courts must give to prior
state court findings of fact:
(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall
have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by
clear and convincing evidence.
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a
claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evi-
dentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-
(A) the claim relies on-
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously un-
available; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously dis-
covered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.76
This provision makes the possibility of an evidentiary hearing remote
unless the petitioner can establish that there is an intervening new rule
or overwhelming newly discovered evidence that would tend to prove
his innocence.
Despite the presumption of correctness in § 2254(e)(1),
§ 2254(d)(2) appears to leave open federal habeas review of historical
facts to determine whether the state court's determination of the facts
was "unreasonable."'77 Thus, the new statutory scheme does little to
protect even state court determination of historical facts, leaving re-
view of mixed questions wide open.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. 1997).
75. Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title I, § 104, 110 Stat. 1218 (Supp. 1997).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1996).
77. Yackle, supra note 5, at 382 n.4.
HI. Drawing Lines in the Sand: Law/Fact Jurisprudence
A. Questions of Fact. The Court as Observer
In Thompson v. Keohane, the petitioner was convicted of murder-
ing his ex-wife. He alleged that his confession was obtained illegally
when he was questioned in police custody without being given the Mi-
randa warnings.78 This type of Miranda claim presents what has gen-
erally been characterized as a mixed question of law and fact.
According to the Thompson majority, while factual issues may
"encompass more than 'basic, primary, or historical facts,' their reso-
lution depends heavily on the trial court's appraisal of witness credi-
bility and demeanor. '79 The majority admitted that "'the Court has
not charted an entirely clear course in th[e] area"' of distinguishing
questions of fact from questions of law or mixed questions of law and
fact.8
0
The Court has characterized juror impartiality and competency to
stand trial as "factual issues" entitled to the presumption of correct-
ness.81 For example, in Patton v. Yount, the petitioner, a high school
math teacher, confessed to murdering one of his students.' His first
conviction was reversed due to a Miranda violation. After his second
conviction was upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, petitioner
claimed that the jury was biased by excessive pretrial publicity.83 The
Court upheld the trial court's findings that jury impartiality was not
affected by pretrial publicity.8 The Court held that the statutory pre-
sumption of correctness applied to the state court's determination of
whether juror bias existed. Since this determination "is essentially
one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor.., the trial
court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal,
to 'special deference."' 85 Because voir dire takes place in open court
78. 116 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1995).
79. Id. at 465 (1995).
80. Id. at 464 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985)).
81. Id. (citing Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (competency), and Wain-
wright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985), Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984), and
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (juror impartiality)). In contrast, voluntariness
of a confession and effectiveness of counsel have been characterized as issues of law. Id. at
465 (citing Miller, 474 U.S. at 116) (voluntariness of confession), Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) and Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980) (ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claims)).
82. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1027.
83. See id. at 1027-28.
84. See iU. at 1035.
85. Id. at 1038 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
500 (1984)).
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and "Uj]urors ... cannot be expected invariably to express themselves
carefully or even consistently[,] ... it is [the trial court] judge who is
best situated to determine competency to serve impartially.
8 6
Similarly, in Rushen v. Spain,87 a juror met privately with the trial
judge to inform him that she knew one of the defense witnesses had
murdered her childhood best friend. The trial judge obtained her as-
surance that this knowledge would not affect the impartiality of her
deliberations, but he did not record the conversations or inform either
party of his meetings with the juror.88 The Court upheld the state
appellate court's determination that the ex parte communications be-
tween the juror and the trial judge were harmless constitutional er-
ror.89 Although noting that "[t]he final decision whether the alleged
constitutional error was harmless is one of federal law," the Court
concluded that "the factual findings arising out of the state courts'
post-trial hearings are entitled to a presumption of correctness....
The substance of the ex parte communications and their effect on ju-
ror impartiality are questions of historical fact entitled to this
presumption." 90
The Court has also applied the presumption of correctness to
findings of a defendant's competency to stand trial.91 The Court em-
phasized the importance of the trial court's role as observer: "'Face to
face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position
of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful
cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most
accurate method of ascertaining the truth." '9 '
As the Thompson dissent notes, where this is true, federal habeas
courts are perhaps the least well suited to consider the claims at issue
because they are the farthest removed in time and place from the live
testimony presented at trial.93
86. Id at 1039; see also Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26 (There will be situations where the trial
judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faith-
fully and impartially apply the law... . This is why deference must be paid to the trial judge
who sees and hears the juror.").
87. 464 U.S. 114, 116 (1983).
88. See id.
89. See id at 120-21.
90. lId (citations omitted).
91. See Maggio, 462 U.S. at 113.
92. Id. at 118 (quoting United States v. Oregon Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952))
(citations omitted).
93. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 467-69 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
B. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: Review or Defer?
In Brown, Justice Frankfurter defined the classic distinction be-
tween questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact:
Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not dispose
of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal significance
of such facts... the District Judge must exercise his own judg-
ment on this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus, so-
called mixed questions or the application of constitutional prin-
ciples to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with
the federal judge.94
As the Court noted in Thompson, "the proper characterization of a
question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery."'95 Indeed, even
where the issue is a mixed question of law and fact, "subsidiary factual
questions... are entitled to the presumption" of correctness.
96
1. Thompson v. Keohane: The Facts
On September 10, 1986, two hunters found a dead woman float-
ing in a lake near Fairbanks, Alaska.97 She had been stabbed twenty-
nine times and her body was wrapped in chains and a bedspread. 98
Alaska state troopers issued a press release asking citizens to help
them identify the body.99 The next day, petitioner Thompson called
the police and told them that the description in the press release
sounded like his ex-wife, Dixie Thompson, who had been missing for
about a month.10° The police established through dental records that
the body was indeed that of Dixie Thompson.101 On September 15, a
state trooper phoned Thompson and asked him to come to the police
station to identify items purportedly belonging to Dixie.1°2 It was
later established that the trooper's primary motivation in calling
Thompson was to investigate the murder. 0 3
94. Brown, 344 U.S. at 507 (citation omitted). In other words, "a mixed question [is]
one that requires the decision maker to apply law to facts." Lee, supra note 9, at 238.
95. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 464. The distinction between "law" and "fact" may in-
deed be "a formalistic riddle." Lee, supra note 9, at 237.
96. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). In Miller, the Court cited issues such as
whether the petitioner had been given a "truth serum" or whether police officers actually
used coercive tactics as examples of subsidiary facts entitled to the presumption of correct-
ness. Id
97. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 460.
98. See id. at 467.




103. See id at 460-61.
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Thompson drove to police headquarters in his truck and immedi-
ately identified the items as Dixie's.1°4 He stayed at the police station
for two hours while two unarmed troopers questioned him about
Dixie's disappearance. The conversation took place in an interview
room and was tape-recorded."° Thompson was not given Miranda
warnings at the beginning of this interview.1°6 Throughout the inter-
view, however, the troopers repeatedly told Thompson he was free to
leave. 107 They also told him they suspected him of killing Dixie.'0
After telling him that they had warrants to search his house and truck,
the officers continued their questioning.0 9 During this interview, and
in response to questions that were designed to elicit a self-incriminat-
ing response, Thompson eventually confessed to murdering Dixie.
1 0
At the end of the interview, the troopers allowed Thompson to
leave but impounded his truck in order to search it."' The troopers
gave Thompson a ride to a friend's house. 1 2 About two hours later,
Thompson was arrested and charged with first-degree murder." 3
The trial court denied Thompson's motion to suppress the taped
statements." 4 The trial court held that Thompson was not "in cus-
tody" for Miranda purposes during the September 15 questioning and
that the troopers were, therefore, not obliged to give Thompson his
104. See id at 461.
105. See id
106. See id
107. See i. For example: "[Y]ou can go any time you want to .... I mean you're free
to get up and walk out of here now and.., never talk to me again." Id at 461 n.1.
108. The trooper also said, "I know that you did this thing.... I can see it when I'm
looking at you. And I know you care about Dixie. I mean this isn't something that you
wanted to happen." Id. The officers explicitly told Thompson they thought he had killed
Dixie: "your friends or associates ... have been kind of calling up and.., they've been
pointing at you"; "we can prove conclusively beyond a reasonable doubt that-that you
were responsible for this thing"; "you haven't told me the part about where Dixie gets
killed." Id. at 461 n.1.
109. See id, at 460-61.
110. See id. at 461.
111. See i&
112. See id.
113. The trial court commented on the short period of time between the questioning
and the arrest as being one of the factors that made the trial court's denial of Thompson's
motion to suppress the taped statements a close call. See id. at 462. Precedent suggests
that this emphasis is irrelevant, as the time of arrest generally has not been emphasized or
even discussed in the Court's decisions. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122
(1983) (5 days elapsed between interrogation and arrest); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 492-95 (1977) (no time of arrest stated in facts).
114. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 461.
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Miranda warnings at that stage in the investigation.115 The trial court
concluded that "a reasonable person would have felt free to leave."'
1 6
The prosecution played Thompson's tape-recorded confession at
trial, and the jury convicted him of first-degree murder and tampering
with evidence."17 The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed." 8 The
Alaska Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition for review." 9
Thompson then filed a habeas corpus petition in the federal dis-
trict court.120 The district court denied the writ, holding that the state
court's determination that Thompson was not "in custody" for Mi-
randa purposes at the time of the September 15 statements was enti-
tled to a presumption of correctness under former § 2254(d). 121 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the cus-
tody issue was a question of fact.122
The Ninth Circuit based its decision on Krantz v. Briggs."z In
Krantz, the court held that a state court's determination of custody
status for Miranda purposes is a finding of fact entitled to a presump-
tion of correctness under former § 2254(d) where the state made its
determination after a hearing on the merits.2 4 The court cited Miller
for the proposition that "an issue does not lose its factual character
merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitu-
tional question."'"
2. Determination of Custodial Status Under Miranda
The Miranda decision requires that before questioning a person
who has been taken into police custody, the police must warn the per-
son "that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."' 2 6 Custo-
dial interrogations, which require Miranda warnings before question-
ing is initiated, are defined as "questioning... after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
115. See id at 461-62.
116. 1& at 462.
117. See i





123. See i& at 462 n.4 (citing Krantz v. Briggs, 983 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1989)).
124. See Krantz, 983 F.2d at 964.
125. I& (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985)).
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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any significant way."' 27 The well-established relevant inquiry as to
whether a suspect was "in custody" at a particular point is "how a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation.' 28 This objective "reasonable man" test turns on whether
there was "'restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associ-
ated with a formal arrest.' 1 29 If a reasonable person would have felt
he was free to leave, then he is not "in custody" and the duty to give
the Miranda warnings is not triggered.
30
In Oregon v. Mathiason,'3' the defendant was suspected of com-
mitting a burglary. About twenty-five days after the burglary, a police
officer visited Mathiason's apartment, leaving a card asking him to call
the officer. Mathiason did call and arranged to meet with the officer
at a nearby police station. He was questioned in an interview room.
The officer falsely told him that officers had found his fingerprints at
the scene of the crime. Within five minutes, Mathiason confessed to
the burglary. 32 The Court found that "there is no indication that the
questioning took place in a context where respondent's freedom to
depart was restricted in any way.' 33 The officer's false statement
about the fingerprints was held to be irrelevant in determining the
custody issue.' 34
In Mathiason, the Court noted that "[a]ny interview of one sus-
pected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it,
simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law en-
forcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be
charged with a crime.' 35 Police officers are not required to give Mi-
randa warnings to everyone they question. The warnings are also not
127. IdL
128. Berkemer v. McCray, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). This test, characterized as an ob-
jective "reasonable man" test, is considered superior to a subjective test because it does
not rely "either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor
does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of
every person whom they question." Id. at 442 n.35 (quoting People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 255,
260 (N.Y. 1967)).
129. Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct 1526, 1529 (1994) (citations omitted).
130. Id (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124 n.2 (1983) (per curiam)). As
Justice O'Connor has noted, "[t]he task of determining when a defendant is in 'custody'
has proved to be a 'slippery one."' Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 711 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309
(1985)).
131. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
132. See iU. at 493-94.
133. Id at 495.
134. See id at 495-96.
135. Id at 495.
required merely because the questioning takes place at a police sta-
tion or because the person being questioned is already a suspect.
136
In California v. Beheler,137 the defendant's stepbrother killed a
woman in a failed robbery. Beheler called the police almost immedi-
ately after the shooting.138 He made inculpatory statements to police
officers who arrived on the scene. Later that day, the police asked
Beheler to accompany them to the station for questioning, while in-
forming him that he was not under arrest. He agreed to come with
them. 39 Once at the station, Beheler discussed the murder even
though he had not been Mirandized. The interview lasted less than
thirty minutes.' 4° At the end of the interview, the police allowed
Beheler to leave. Five days later, he was arrested and questioned
again about the murder. He was advised of his Miranda rights and
waived them. During his second interview, he admitted that his ear-
lier incriminating statements to the police were voluntary.' 4 1 The trial
court admitted both statements into evidence, and Beheler was con-
victed of aiding and abetting first-degree murder. 42 The Supreme
Court held that Beheler was not "in custody" during the
questioning.
43
Finally, in an Eighth Circuit case, the circumstances of the ques-
tioning paralleled those in Thompson. 44 In March 1987, a mutilated
and dismembered female torso was found in rural St. Charles County,
Missouri. Shortly after this grisly discovery, petitioner Feltrop told
the sheriff in nearby Jefferson County that his girlfriend, Barbara
Roam, was missing. 45 The sheriff suspected that the unidentified
torso might be Roam's. He asked Feltrop to come to the sheriff's of-
fice to meet with investigators. Feltrop drove to the sheriff's office
and waited there for more than two hours for the St. Charles County
officers to arrive.146 Two officers questioned him in a small office.147
About an hour and a half into the interrogation, the officers asked
136. See iU at 495; see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (typical traffic stops do not, with-
out more, amount to "custody").
137. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).





143. See id. at 1123.




So~rine 19971 SCOPE OF FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW
822 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:803
Feltrop if he was a Christian and would tell the truth. Feltrop an-
swered, "She clawed me and tried to take the knife."1" The officers
then gave him the Miranda warnings. 14 9 Feltrop confessed to killing
Roam and directed officers to a trash bag containing her severed
head, hands, and lower legs.' 50 He was later convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death.' 5'
In his federal habeas petition, Feltrop claimed his initial state-
ments were involuntary and were elicited in violation of the Miranda
requirements. 152 The Eighth Circuit reviewed the question of volun-
tariness de novo, but held that the trial court's finding that Feltrop
was not in custody when he made his first incriminating statement was
entitled to a presumption of correctness under former § 2254(d). 53
3. Resolution on Remand
In the Thompson Court's analysis, the Miranda custody determi-
nation requires two separate inquiries: one factual, one legal.' 54 In
this type of determination, however, the legal application is governed
by and closely linked to the factual component, which therefore be-
comes dispositive of the ultimate constitutional issue. The reviewing
court must ask "first, what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reason-
able person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave."' 55 While the first inquiry is factual, the sec-
ond requires the "application of the controlling legal standard to the
historical facts" and is therefore a mixed question of law and fact sub-
ject to de novo review. 6
The Court distinguished Miller, Patton, and Maggio by emphasiz-
ing that "the trial court does not have a first-person vantage on
whether a defendant was 'in custody' for Miranda purposes."'1 57 But
Miranda violations necessarily take place behind closed doors. Given
this reality, the state courts have the closest possible vantage point for
determining the factual issues, which in a Miranda context may be




151. See i. at 768-69.
152. See id at 772.
153. See id. at 772-73.
154. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 465.
155. Id-
'156. Id.
157. Id. at 466.
fendant. 5 8 The majority also noted that determinations of Miranda
violations have precedential value, while decisions about juror impar-
tiality and defendant competency are made on a case-by-case basis
and generally lack precedential value.159 The facts of each potentially
custodial situation are also unique, however, and do not create clear
precedent unless they form the basis for bright-line rules. (For exam-
ple, a court-created bright-line rule might announce that a thirty min-
ute detention is not overlong, but a thirty-five minute detention is.)
And since the Court has thus far resisted drawing such a line, review
of Miranda violations may amount to "unending review of fact pat-
terns too peculiar to recur.
160
The majority's analysis implies that while state courts can inter-
pret claims which are constitutionally significant as long as their deci-
sions do not create precedent, the task of making decisions with
precedential value is apparently best left to the federal courts, even
though state courts are not otherwise bound by lower federal courts'
judgments on federal constitutional issues. Summarily concluding that
"state-court 'in custody' determinations warrant independent review
by a federal habeas court," the Court remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit for reconsideration of petitioner's Miranda claim.
161
Justice Thomas concluded in his dissent (joined by Justice Rehn-
quist) that Thompson would not be able to establish a Miranda viola-
tion even under de novo review. 62 It is undisputed that Thompson
came to the police station voluntarily, was repeatedly told he could
leave, and that he was in fact allowed to leave when the interrogation
was over.163 He was, however, also subjected to aggressive question-
ing and psychological pressure designed to elicit an incriminating
response. 64
Justice Thomas then noted that if relief was granted to Thompson
based on the facts of the case, it would amount to an extension of
precedent in a novel direction and would, therefore, be barred by
158. See i at 468 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The state trial judge is, in my estimation,
the best-positioned actor to decide the relatively straightforward and fact-laden question of
Miranda custody .... In making the custody determination, the state trial judge must
consider a complex of diverse and case-specific factors in an effort to gain an overall sense
of the defendant's situation at the time of the interrogation.").
159. See U at 466.
160. Lee, supra note 9, at 236.
161. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 467.
162. See id. at 470 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 469.
164. See id. at 460-61.
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Teague v. Lane,165 which precludes reconsideration of federal consti-
tutional claims based on a new rule or novel application of an existing
rule announced after the final state court judgment.166 The new sec-
tion 2254(d) echoes the definition of a "new" rule or novel application
expressed in Teague and its progeny. 67 Relief may still be granted,
however, when the state court's ruling was "contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States."" As Profes-
sor Larry Yackle has suggested, "the reference to 'clearly established'
federal law implies that federal habeas is not typically to be a vehicle
for advancing the development of federal rights.' 69 If Thompson had
been decided after the 1996 Act was passed, Justice Thomas's argu-
ment could have been employed to restrict consideration of the peti-
tioner's claim to whether the state court's application of Miranda
principles was an unreasonable application of the law. This in turn
would restrict a reviewing federal court to consideration of the overall
correctness of the state's application of the law rather than dissection
of the facts or de novo application of the legal standard that was dis-
positive of the ultimate constitutional issue (in Thompson's case,
whether his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was
violated).
The fact that the questioning took place in the police station or
that Thompson was already a suspect is irrelevant for the purposes of
the "in custody" determination.1 70 While the questioning officer's
subjective belief that the person he is interrogating is a suspect does
not affect the custody inquiry, the picture changes if the officer's be-
liefs are communicated "by word or deed, to the individual being
questioned.' 71 Even where communicated, "those beliefs are rele-
vant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in
the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the
breadth of his or her 'freedom of action." ' 172 The question of whether
those beliefs existed, or were communicated to the defendant, is best
165. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
166. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 469 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Teague, 489
U.S. 288 (1989)).
167. See Yackle, supra note 5, at 415.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996), as amended.
169. Yackle, supra note 5, at 415.
170. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977) (per curiam); see also Stansbury
v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529-30 (1994).
171. Stansbury, 114 S. Ct. at 1530.
172. Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCray, 468 U.S. 420, 435 n.22 (1984)).
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answered through the presentation of testimony and its evaluation by
the trial court.
In an Eleventh Circuit case, the police told petitioner Purvis, a
mentally ill man with the psychological capabilities of an eight- to ten-
year-old child, that he would die in the electric chair for the murder he
had allegedly committed.173 He was later questioned by a psychia-
trist.174 After five to ten minutes of conversation, Purvis admitted to
killing his neighbor.175 Police then gave Purvis the Miranda warnings
before recording his confession. 176 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the
state trial court's finding that Purvis "was not deprived of his freedom
of action and that he had sufficient intellectual capacity to understand
the circumstances surrounding his questioning.' 1 77 The court noted
that Purvis had gone to the police station voluntarily and was free to
leave until the psychiatrist told the detectives about his confession. 78
Although the officers told Thompson about their suspicions, this
is not dispositive of the issue of whether a reasonable person in
Thompson's position would have felt free to leave.179 Thompson, a
man of normal intelligence, was arguably in a stronger position than
Purvis to assess his freedom to end the questioning. The fact that
Thompson's truck was impounded is also not dispositive. This is par-
ticularly true since the police actually assisted his departure by provid-
ing transportation to a friend's house. Precedent suggests that the fact
that a suspect actually left after questioning is one factor supporting
the inference that he believed he was free to do so.' s0 On remand, the
Ninth Circuit should conclude that under the totality of the circum-
stances, Thompson's statements were admissible. This conclusion sup-
ports Justice Thomas's finality-based argument that the Court should
"avoid putting the State of Alaska to the uncertainty and expense of
defending for the sixth time in nine years an eminently reasonable
judgment secured against a confessed murderer." " '
173. Purvis v. Dugger, 932 F.2d 1413, 1415 (11th Cir. 1991).
174. See i. at 1416.
175. See id
176. See id.
177. I. at 1419.
178. See id. at 1418.
179. See Stansbury, 114 S. Ct at 1530.
180. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 713-14.
181. Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 470 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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C. Constitutional Rights and the "Three F's": Finality, Federalism,
and Fairness
1. Deterrence and Resolution: Social Values and the Need for Finality
Like Thompson, most petitioners who avail themselves of federal
habeas corpus review have been convicted of serious crimes after a
jury trial.1 82 A recent multisite study found that sixty-two percent of
habeas petitioners were convicted after trial,' 83 where the average
jury trial rate for felonies was just six percent."s Of course, defend-
ants pursuing these remedies are likely facing lengthy prison terms or
the death penalty and are therefore less likely to plead guilty initially.
Federal habeas petitioners are also more likely to have been repre-
sented at trial, often because of the seriousness of their crimes. 85
Therefore, at a threshold level, federal habeas review gives additional
judicial attention to claims of defendants who have already received
more judicial process than the vast majority of criminal defendants.
186
As one critic put it, the habeas system allows "a persistent defendant,
however guilty, [ ] eventually [to] get lucky and persuade some judge
or court to find error, given unlimited opportunities to do so.' ' 187
The need for finality in a criminal judgment is a serious compet-
ing value that, if prioritized, would operate to reduce the availability
of federal habeas review. As one scathing commentary put it, sup-
porting expansive federal habeas review "ignores the fact that frivo-
lous and harassing litigation is itself a seriously antisocial activity, and
disregards its potential effect of increasing the arrogance of un-
repentant criminals.""8 It is undeniable that federal habeas review
after the exhaustion of state court remedies interferes with the effi-
cient administration of justice and consumes scarce judicial resources.
182. See RoBinsoN STUDY supra note 8, at 4(a), cited in REviEw OF STATE JUDGmENTs,
supra note 6, at 36. The Robinson study found that over 80% of federal habeas petitioners
were convicted by jury trial.
183. See SJI STUDY, supra note 7, at 36.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See REviEw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at iv.
187. Remarks of Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman at a Seminar on the
Administration of Justice Sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Annapolis, Maryland, at
1-2 (Mar. 8, 1986), quoted in REvinw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at 2.
Some "notorious" petitioners cited by the Office of Legal Policy in support of its
sweeping reform proposals included Booker Hillery (tried and convicted three times for
the murder of fifteen-year-old Marlene Miller in the farm town of Hanford, California),
Johnny Witt (whose case was heard by the Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985)), and Arthur Aiken (a gas station robber still in the process of appealing claims
stemming from his 1965 murder conviction). See id. at 76-90.
188. Id. at vi.
It is also true, however, that where constitutional rights are impli-
cated, putting a premium on efficiency carries the risk that constitu-
tional violations might go unremedied. The question is whether these
risks are important enough to justify overturning state court judg-
ments years after the crime occurred.
On a practical level, it is important to note that petitioners seek-
ing federal habeas review generally remain in prison throughout the
lengthy litigation.18 9 Therefore, the concern about undermining the
deterrent effect of a criminal conviction is exaggerated, particularly in
light of the relatively small number of prisoners who seek federal
habeas review.19° Indeed, in some noncapital cases, the petitioner
may be paroled before the habeas litigation is completed. 91 Ulti-
mately, the vast majority of convicted criminals are punished for their
crime and serve their sentences without seeking federal relief.
2. Respect for State Court Judgments
Objectively, state and federal courts have an equal obligation to
uphold federal constitutional law.' 92 Indeed, "one of the central fea-
tures of our federalism [is] that federal law is a part of the state law,
that deciding federal questions is an intrinsic part of the business of
state judges." 93 Yet the structure of federal habeas review charges
the lower federal courts with evaluating the adequacy of state court
interpretations of constitutional rights. The resulting tension between
the state and federal systems has been the focus of much criticism.
Justice O'Connor, a former state appellate judge, has observed that:
[W]e should strive to make both the federal and the state sys-
tems strong, independent and viable.... State judges in assum-
ing office take an oath to support the federal as well as the state
189. See REvIEw OF STATE JUDGMENTs, supra note 6.
190. In 1991, only one percent of state court prisoners ffied federal habeas petitions.
See SJI STUDY, supra note 7, at 14. The percentage of state prisoners seeking federal
habeas relief has ranged from a low of 0.52% in 1961 to a high of 5.14% in 1970. The
decline in filings since 1970 is at least partly attributable to the Court's decisions limiting
the availability of federal habeas relief. See REVIEW OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6,
at 22.
191. See Krantz, 983 F.2d at 962 n.1. Petitioner finished serving his state prison term for
assault and was paroled before his appeal of the district court's dismissal of his habeas
corpus petition reached the Ninth Circuit. He was subsequently reincarcerated in another
state for violating his parole.
192. See Who Is on Trial?, supra note 61, at 7 (statement of Paul Cassell).
193. Bator, supra note 10, at 510-11.
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constitution. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion when
given the responsibility and opportunity to do so.194
The Thompson majority's value judgments about the legitimacy of
state court precedent preserves the Court-created hierarchy that con-
flicts with the traditional conception of federalism.
The concern about the lack of parity between state and federal
courts is closely linked to finality issues. Stressing the importance of
finality, one commentator noted that "if a job can be well done once,
it should not be done twice."195 In this same vein, if a state court can
competently adjudicate federal constitutional claims, then a lower fed-
eral court should not be permitted to overturn its judgments. The ex-
tremely low reversal rate on habeas suggests both that state and
federal courts generally agree on the validity of particular constitu-
tional claims and that substantial judicial resources are being ex-
pended to search for the proverbial needle in the haystack. 96 As
Justice Jackson stated in Brown: "It must prejudice the occasional
meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He
who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the
attitude that the needle is not worth the search.'
'1 97
Protection from erroneous constitutional interpretation by state
courts is ensured by the availability of direct review to the Court.198
Even the judgment of the Court is superior largely because it is final.
Justice Jackson aptly noted: "We are not final because we are infalli-
ble, but we are infallible only because we are final."'19 9
It may be argued that state court judges, both at the trial and
appellate levels, are more likely to have personal biases and to have
those biases reinforced (rather than challenged) by sitting in a com-
munity to which they are likely to have personal and professional ties.
But while federal judges may be better insulated from political pres-
sures and local bias than state judges, they are certainly not immune
to public opinion or free from personal prejudices. In some situations,
all the parties (including the petitioner) may benefit from state court
judges' familiarity with and understanding of the community in which
194. Sandra D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 801, 814-15
(1981).
195. Bator, supra note 10, at 451.
196. The similarity of the claims raised and the high affirmance rate clearly suggest
"duplication of effort" by the federal courts. SJI STuDY, supra note 7, at 91.
197. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1.953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
198. See Who Is on Trial?, supra note 61, at 7 (statement of Paul Cassell).
199. Brown, 344 U.S. at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
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the crimes took place-an understanding that may not be shared by
federal judges, especially at the appellate level.2°°
3. The "Right" to a Federal Forum
Although Justice Frankfurter maintained that federal courts were
required to decide state prisoners' constitutional claims, he never
made the source of this mandate entirely clear. 01 Arguably, state
prisoners do not have a right to a federal adjudication of their consti-
tutional claims because Article III of the Constitution did not man-
date the creation of the lower federal courts and, therefore, there is no
constitutional right of access to this federal forum.2  The supposed
right to a federal forum rests in part on the belief that federal courts
are more sensitive and receptive to criminal defendants' constitutional
claims.20 3 This idea is irrevocably tied to the decisional hierarchy sus-
tained by the Court in Thompson. The Thompson Court held that
where the state court is not "in an appreciably better position than the
federal habeas court to make [the ultimate] determination," the deter-
mination falls to the federal court.2' With that hierarchy in place,
even the highest state courts will never be in "an appreciably better
position" to make constitutional determinations of mixed questions,
despite their objectively equal mandate to uphold and interpret the
federal Constitution and their proximity to and intimate knowledge of
the case.
The 1996 Act was designed to address the procedure for filing
federal habeas claims, rather than make big substantive changes in the
scope of federal habeas review. Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the 1996
Act's principal sponsors, commented that the goal of the statute was
to fix problems in the system, "while still preserving and protecting
the constitutional rights of those who are accused."2 °5 Traditionally,
de novo review in the federal habeas context meant that federal courts
200. See Thompson, 116 S. Ct. at 469 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Justice Thomas put
it, "I have no doubt that the state trier of fact is best situated to put himself in the suspect's
shoes, and consequently is in a better position to determine what it would have been like
for a reasonable man to be in the suspect's shoes." Id.
201. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 488-513 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); see also Rlvinw OF
STATE JuDGmENTs, supra note 6, at 20-21.
202. See REvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at 42. This argument does not
affect the right to petition for direct review by the United States Supreme Court, which is
explicitly constitutionally guaranteed. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
203. See RPvmw OF STATE JUDGMENTS, supra note 6, at 43.
204. 116 S. Ct. at 466 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985)).
205. 141 CONG. RPc. S7479 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch), quoted
in Yackle, supra note 5, at 398.
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considering a petitioner's claims could ignore previous state court de-
cisions on the merits and proceed accordingly.20 6 However, under the
new section 2254(d), a state court's prior adjudication on the merits
becomes the starting point for federal courts' consideration of consti-
tutional claims.2°7 Arguably, this change will have a "psychological
effect" on federal judges who will now "limit ... judgment to whether
a previous decision-maker reached the correct result" rather than
"shoulder[ing the] initial responsibility for addressing and resolving a
question. °208 Under the revised statutory scheme, federal courts
should at least review the factual components of mixed questions
deferentially, assessing only the overall accuracy of the state court de-
cision without needless and burdensome reconsideration of esoteric
and unique facts.
IV. Conclusion: How Much Justice Can We Afford?
In Thompson, the Court relied on value judgments in extending
the already fine distinction between questions of fact (entitled to the
presumption of correctness of § 2254(e), as amended by the 1996 Act)
and mixed questions of law and fact (reviewed de novo). The Court
used the distinction to allocate this additional burden to the federal
courts without considering whether the courts could meet the in-
creased demands placed on them. The Court also ignored the dis-
sent's concern about wasteful duplicative review of state court
judgments.
The 1996 Act does not, however, substantively alter the existing
federal habeas scheme.20 9 If federal habeas review is to continue in its
current form, then the establishment of separate courts to consider
habeas cases should be considered to ensure that other cases in the
federal caseload get the attention they deserve. In fact, there may
already be de facto separate process, at least for the petitions of death
row prisoners.210 One district court judge who was involved in Ted
Bundy's appeal complained before a House Subcommittee about the
"inordinate amount of time being spent on duplicative review ...
[which] will take time away from other people who have a right to
206. See Yackle, supra note 5, at 412.
207. See id. at 412-13.
208. ma at 413.
209. See idU at 422, 449.
210. See SJI S=tUY, supra note 7, at 83, 93 (special clerks assigned solely to track capi-
tal cases).
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their day in court. ' 211 On the other hand, a separate judicial track for
habeas petitions may be too costly and would still divert resources
from the rest of the federal caseload.
Additionally, although many petitioners had representation at
trial, most petitioners represent themselves when filing federal habeas
claims.212 Therefore, substantial time and effort may be spent just to
determine which claims are being raised. Pro se claims are often
poorly framed and difficult to understand. The appointment of coun-
sel might improve the quality of the petitions by framing the claims
clearly and by eliminating petitioners' weakest arguments.
The SJI study suggested that Alabama's disproportionately high
filing rate was linked to its habitual offender statute, which exposed
prisoners with prior felony convictions to lengthy sentences.213 A sim-
ilar outcome can be expected from California's three strikes law,
which imposes mandatory life sentences for a third conviction of cer-
tain listed "serious and/or violent felony offenses. '214 In a large state
with an already overburdened court system, this increased demand on
the courts underscores the need for a separate system. As the cost of
searching for the rare meritorious claim increases, expansion of the
courts' capacity to review habeas claims may become prohibitive. In-
creasingly, duplicative federal habeas review is becoming a luxury we
may not be able to afford.
211. Who Is on Trial?, supra note 61, at 67 (statement of Hon. G. Kendall Sharp, Mid-
dle District of Florida).
212. In one study, 75% of federal habeas petitioners filed without representation. See
SJI STUDY, supra note 7, at 37.
213. See it. at 91.
214. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1997); see also id. §§ 1192.7(c) and
667.5(c) for the list of qualifying felonies.
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